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materials, including its value, and summary information on the U.S. seed industry. It first 
considers intellectual property rights--types, economic incentives that they bestow, and uses 
across developed and developing countries. Second, it considers the U.S. seed industry--
characteristics for major crops, optimal pricing of a superior variety, and relative size of 
public and private research expenditures. Some conclusions and implications are presented in 
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Economics of Intellectual Property Rights 
in Plant Materials 
 
Intellectual property is attracting lots of attention these days. For more than two 
decades, empirical evidence has been accumulating that investments in R&D have enhanced 
the rate of growth of multifactor productivity of U.S. agriculture and of agriculture in several 
other countries (see Huffman and Evenson 1993; Ruttan 1982). The social rate of return on 
these investments has been positive and generally large. Finally the growth theorists have 
turned to models of endogenous economic growth in an attempt to better explain the dramatic 
differences in growth in real income per capita of Asian countries over the past three 
decades. Human capital has been a key factor in these models, but Romer's recent work has 
incorporated both human capital and intellectual property produced by inputs of human 
capital and the stock of previous inventions. His model produces perpetual real endogenous 
economic growth. 
One form of intellectual property is improved plant materials (OTA 1992; National 
Research Council 1993). They are quite important because most of the world's population 
obtain a large share of their calories and nutrients from food that is from plants and plant 
parts. The types of property rights to the new plant materials seem likely to have important 
implications for the public versus private incentives/role for producing these advances, the 
international transfer of plant genetic materials, and the rate of economic growth (at least of 
agriculture). 
The objective of this paper is to present an economic perspective on intellectual 
property in plant materials, including its value, and summary information on the U.S. seed 
industry. The paper first considers intellectual property rights--types, economic incentives 
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that they bestow, and uses across developed and developing countries. Second, the paper 
considers the U.S. seed industry--characteristics for major crops, optimal pricing of a 
superior variety, and relative size of public and private research expenditures. Some 
conclusions and implications are presented in the final section. 
 
Intellectual Property 
The potential importance of intellectual property to modern economic growth has 
been exploited by Romer (1990) in his models of endogenous technological change. For 
nations having sufficient human capital, his models generates perpetual growth in real 
income per capita through the production of knowledge/new technology. For nations having 
sparse human capital, no new knowledge/new technology is produced, and these countries do 
not experience any (or very little) economic growth. Intellectual property in plant materials is 
only one of several forms of intellectual property that has the potential to contribute to 
economic growth. 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property is the results or outputs from creative efforts of the human mind. 
These efforts include the creative works of scientists, inventors, artists, musicians, 
entrepreneurs, and farmers. Focusing on plant materials, intellectual property is created in 
processes that use existing genetic resources and technology or knowledge and human capital 
services. Some of the new plant materials are economically useless, but a few will have 
characteristics that are superior to previous ones. Among the superior ones, some represent 
large advances and others are only slight improvements, e.g., imitations. Considerable 
evidence exists that a science-based research and development system can produce relatively 
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steady advances in major crop yields, e.g., corn, soybeans, rice, wheat (Huffman and 
Evenson 1993, Evenson 1993b, National Research Council 1993). 
Intellectual property is costly to produce (for the first time) because it uses human 
capital services and other inputs, but it is relatively inexpensive to reproduce and distribute, 
given the initial discovery (Wright 1983; Romer 1990). Although several reward systems and 
innovation marketing systems could be employed for plant materials, national governments 
have tended to use only a few. When governments assign property rights in plant materials, 
they have generally chosen to give limited monopoly positions to the innovator (National 
Research Council 1993; van Wijk, Cohen, and Komen 1993; Siebeck 1993). The monopoly 
position of the innovator grants him the right to control the use of the innovation, e.g., to 
license its use for a fee or royalty or to sell the intellectual property. This income is a 
potential source of payment to the innovator for his creative efforts. Limiting the monopoly 
rights of innovators means innovations will be available at lower prices to potential users. 
This has the potential for increasing the social usefulness of innovations, given discovery. 
IPRs Granted by Nations. Breeders' rights and patents are the most common IPRs 
given to innovators (National Research Council 1993; van Wijk, Cohen, and Komen 1993; 
Siebeck 1993). Plant breeders' rights are granted by a national government to plant breeders 
to exclude others from producing or commercializing materials of a specific plant variety for 
a specified period of time, generally 15-20 years. The criteria to be met for these rights 
generally requires that a variety be novel, distinct from existing varieties, and uniform and 
stable in successive generations. The applicant, however, is not required to disclose the 
scientific nature of his intellectual property, or his innovation. 
Plant breeders' rights have several limitations. First, they apply only to the national 
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boundaries of the country granting the IPR. A plant variety protected only by U.S. breeders' 
rights, a plant variety protection certificate, can be taken to Mexico for reproduction and sale 
in Mexico without violating U.S. or Mexican plant breeders' rights. Second, several 
exemptions exist that limit the plant breeders' right but that increase the benefits to others. 
The protected variety is available for research uses, i.e., the study of the nature of the 
innovation, without reproducing or multiplying it for commercial use. Other plant breeders 
can use the protected variety in a breeding program to create new varieties (or offsprings) 
which they can exploit commercially. Farmers who plant a protected variety can save part of 
their harvested seed for their own later plantings. 
A patent is a right granted by a government to inventors to exclude others from 
imitating, manufacturing, using, or selling a specific invention for commercial use for a 
specific period of time, generally 17-20 years. The primary criterion applied by patent 
examiners is that the innovation must be novel or new, not obvious to someone skilled in the 
art, and potentially useful. In the patent application, the inventor must describe or deposit a 
sample of the invention, and in this way, he discloses his invention to the public. In 
particular, patent protection applies only to the invention disclosed in the patent application. 
Some of the same limitations apply to patents as to breeder's rights. The patent 
holders' rights extend only to the national boundaries of the granting country. Within the 
granting country, the invention is available to others only for research uses, i.e., 
experimentation.  However, it is an infringement on the rights of a patent holder for 
someone to use a patented variety in a breeding program without the permission of the 
patent holder or farmers to save seeds from patented varieties and plant them. Producing a 
patented variety outside the territory of the patent-granting country and selling it there is 
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technically not an infringement on the patent holders' rights. Innovators, however, generally 
apply for patents in all countries where there is a significant market for their product. 
Intellectual property in plant materials is a nonrival good (Cornes and Sandler). This 
means that the intellectual property, e.g., a variety is not used up when others use it in 
scientific research, commercial breeding programs, or for farm seeds. In developed countries, 
patent and breeders' rights make unauthorized use of the intellectual property excludable at a 
reasonable cost. Hence, this intellectual property is not a pure public good. 
The property rights are created in such a way that the innovator is required to partly 
or fully reveal his innovation. This makes the innovation a useful input or resource in future 
research and breeding programs. Furthermore, because intellectual property is nonrival and 
of a long life, it can be accumulated almost without bounds (on a per capita basis). Human 
capital, which is embodied in people having finite length of life and yielding rival services, 
does not have similar potential for per capita accumulation or contributions to economic 
growth (Romer). 
Although the innovator is granted a limited monopoly on the commercial use of his 
plant material, will generally be used to produce intermediate inputs; the seeds and plants for 
agricultural production. Although optimal monopoly pricing of intellectual property in plant 
materials may occur, superior materials will be available in the market and bought by 
farmers. Furthermore, Romer (1990) has shown that monopoly pricing of unique intellectual 
property does not cause an unreasonable drag on economic growth. It provides the economic 
incentives for endogenous or private sector advances in technology. 
The intellectual property rights for the innovator are, however, incomplete. This is 
because of limitations imposed in the IPRs and because complete enforcement of the 
 6
property right is not optimal. This means that knowledge spillovers, or positive external 
effects across innovators or across countries are likely to be economically important to 
technology production and transfer. The usefulness of direct plant material transfers is, 
however, limited by the geoclimatic specificity of most plants (Huffman and Evenson 1993; 
Evenson 1993a,b). This means that transferred plant materials have the greatest potential for 
use as breeding or parent materials rather than as varieties that farmers plant directly. 
Furthermore, local scientific expertise and breeding capacity must exist to do the applied 
research needed to create a new variety that is superior to old ones (National Research 
Council 1993b). 
Intercountry comparisons. The highly developed countries have a unique set of 
institutions for protecting and marketing intellectual property in plant materials, and 
developing countries have another (Siebeck 1993; National Research Council 1993b; 
Evenson 1993a,b). All of the developed countries grant intellectual property protection 
through breeders' rights. To date only the United States provides protection through patents--
both special plant patents (since 1930) and regular patents (since 1985). These countries have 
a highly developed private/commercial seed industry that engages in significant intellectual 
property creation and in the reproduction of seeds and plants and their marketing to farmers. 
They also have sufficiently superior intellectual property to export plant materials (Siebeck 
1993; Evenson 1993a,b). 
The developing countries as a group have had a very weak system of intellectual 
property rights in plant materials. Furthermore, they invest very little in enforcement of IPRs 
Why have the developing countries been so lax? They are largely importers of plant materials 
rather than exporters (Evenson 1993; Siebeck 1993; National Research Council 1993; Barton 
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1993). They do not generally have a significant private/commercial seed industry. The 
capacity to create new intellectual property in plant materials that exists in primarily in the 
public sector e.g., in Ethiopia, Kenya, Philippines, Indonesia, Columbia, India, Thailand, 
Mexico. The public national breeding programs in the developing countries have sometimes 
cooperated with the International Agricultural Research Centers (e.g., IRRI, CIMMYT). The 
result has been to develop a nonproprietary system of plant been free exchange of finished 
varieties, advanced breeding lines, and improved raw materials (Siebeck 1993; National 
Research Council 1993, p. 335). In this system, local multiplication and reproduction of 
varieties and distribution of seeds by local entrepreneurs and farmers has been encouraged. 
No international property right law exists that has similarities to rights granted by 
national governments. The institutions that exist are the result of past international 
conferences and conventions that set out to provide a better structure. The Paris Convention 
for Industrial Property has emphasized equal treatment rather than common patent laws for 
member countries. This Convention established the right of equal protection of patent rights 
of a citizen of a granting country and of residents of other member countries. Over 100 
countries are members of this Convention (van Wijk, Cohen, and Komen 1993). 
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), 
which was first signed in 1961, has provided a framework for harmonizing property rights in 
plant materials. Twenty-four countries are currently members. It suggests the use of plant 
breeders' rights or plant patents by member countries. In the 1991 revision of the 
Convention, the plant breeders' rights were strengthened. First, it eliminated the breeders' 
exemption for "essentially derived varieties," i.e., new varieties that were breeding on an 
international scale for developing countries where there has almost identical to existing 
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ones, and it attempted to eliminate farmers' use of seed harvested from protected varieties. 
The member countries, however, would not agree on a minimum standard, and national 
governments of member countries were left to make the final decision on this exemption to 
plant breeders' rights (van Wijk, Cohen, and Komen 1993). 
Developing countries have become concerned about the possible loss of access to 
plant genetic materials. Some institutional changes tend to aid their cause. In 1983, FAO 
established a set of rules known as the "International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources." It primarily attempted to stop or slow the rapid and uncontrolled crop plant 
species by encouraging international conservation efforts. Both developing and developed 
countries agreed that plant genetic resources are part of a common heritage of mankind and 
that they should be available without restrictions to all. The Convention of Biological 
Diversity, the Rio de Janeiro Conference, signed in June 1992 by all attending developed and 
developing countries, except the United States, recognized the sovereign rights of nations 
over their germplasm resources (Siebeck 1993). This was an attempt to limit access of agents 
of developed countries to biological resources of developing countries. 
The developed countries have chosen to use trade access in a bargain for stronger 
intellectual property rights in developing countries. In the recently completed GATT 
negotiations, the developing countries had to agree to advance their IPRs in order to obtain 
access to the markets of the industrialized countries. Second, by including IPRs in the GATT 
trade negotiations, GATT's dispute-settling mechanism can be used to facilitate quick and 
enforceable action against countries that violate GATT agreements on intellectual property. 
New international IPR standards were established for advanced technologies, including 
biotechnology. For plants, this means that member countries should provide equal patent 
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treatment for its own citizens and residents of member countries. 
U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Materials 
Four types of intellectual property rights are available currently in the United States 
for plant materials. They are plant patents, plant variety protection certificates (PVPCs), 
regular patents, and trade secrecy. Patent authority in the United States originated in the 
Constitution, and the Patent Office was established in 1836 to handle patent applications. A 
valid patent must meet three tests: novelty (it must be new), usefulness (it must do what it is 
intended to do), and nonobviousness (it must not be an obvious or trivial extension of the 
state of the art). It must also disclose or remove from secrecy the essential features of the 
invention so as to "enable" others to make or use the invention. A patent holder or owner is 
given the right to exclude others from unauthorized use, sale, or manufacture of the product 
or process for 17 years from date of issuance. 
Plants were not covered by the U.S. patent law until the Plant Patent Act of 1930. The 
plant patents covered only asexually reproduced crops, for example, grafted fruit trees, but 
excluded potatoes and Jerusalem artichokes. Sexually reproduced plants were excluded 
because it was believed at that time that sexually reproduced plants did not breed true and 
monopoly control over staple crops might occur (Knudsen and Hansen 1991). Plant patent 
protection does not extend to seed produced by protected plants, and others can reproduce the 
seed through sexual means. The use of plant patents has been generally limited, but did 
provide some protection to sugarcane varieties, fruit trees, and some ornamentals. 
Plant breeders were granted patent-like protection for sexually reproduced plants by 
the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. It initially excluded celery, tomatoes, bell 
peppers, cucumbers, and okra, because of concerns expressed by the soup companies about 
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possible effects on costs of soup-vegetables, but in 1980 the legislated was amended to 
include several additional vegetables. The applicant must show that a variety is distinct, 
uniform, and stable. The holder or owner is given a Plant Variety Protection Certificate 
(PVPC) which was first good for 17 years from the date of application but was extended in 
1980 to 18 years. The USDA is in charge of PVPC applications (because the Patent Office 
did not see PVPCs as important property rights in 1970). 
There are some important exemptions to the Plant Variety Protection legislation. 
First, varieties can be used in research programs. Second, farmers whose primary occupation 
is growing crops for nonseed purposes can use their harvested seed for planting and selling to 
others, so called bin-run seed. The basic requirements are that less than 49 percent of the seed 
is sold or less than 50 percent of the farm's income is from seed sales (Knudsen and Hansen 
1991). Furthermore, farmers can trade seed among themselves for services or other seed. 
This second exemption has significantly weakened the basic property right granted to PVPC 
holders and has had important incentive effects in the U.S. seed industry. 
Table 1 provides some evidence on the rate of PVPC application for selected crops. 
In field crops, a relatively large number of PVPCs have been issued for soybeans, wheat, and 
cotton. Few PVPCs were granted for field corn before 1985. The private sector accounts for a 
large share of the PVPCs in all crops except for a few, e.g., oats. 
Since 1985, plant material has been covered by regular patents. This is the result of 
changes started in the 1980 Diamond v. Chakrabarty case in which the Supreme Court ruled 
that micro-organisms were patentable. In 1985, the ex parte Hibberd case extended the 
Chakrabarty ruling to plants, seeds, tissue cultures, hybrid plants, and hybrid seeds. Plants 
now can be protected with a patent provided they show utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. 
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A patent applies to both asexually and sexually reproducing crops, lasting for 17 years, and is 
issued by the U.S. Patent Office. Patents have been granted in particular to hybrid corn 
varieties and in 1992 for transgenetic cotton. 
A patent has some advantages over a PVPC but other disadvantages. It does not 
contain a crop or research exemption clause, and it can cover multiple varieties or individual 
components of a variety (U.S. Congress, OTA, 1989; Knudsen and Hansen 1991). 
Disadvantages are that a patent holder must provide full disclosure of the technology and 
provide a detailed description that meets regular patent requirements. Also patent holders 
must have the patented material stored in a depository for about 35 years and filing and issue 
fees may be greater than for a plant patent or PVPC. 
The broad scope of a 1992 patent on transgenetic cotton has sent minor shock waves 
through the U.S. seed industry. On October 27, 1992, the U.S. Patent and Trade Marks Office 
awarded Agracetus, a division of W.R. Grace and Co., the rights to all transgenetically 
engineered cotton produced in the U.S. by any means, for any variety, and in any form 
(Gibbs 1994). This means that W.R. Grace has the rights to royalties on all U.S. cotton seed 
or plants that carry a foreign gene, irrespective of how the transfer of the gene occurs. In 
principle, Grace could demand royalties for much of the research on new transgenetic cotton 
plants. Given the broad scope of the patent, Grace currently intends to freely grant licenses 
for university and government research. One might, however, expect that the scope of this 
patent on cotton will be narrowed by future court decisions. 
Trade secrecy is possible when information on the technology used to produce the 
output is not apparent in the plant material. In crops, trade secrecy has frequently been relied 
on for protecting property rights in hybrid corn varieties because the parents are not generally 
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revealed in the hybrid seed or plant. Modern biotechnical methods are greatly increasing the 
ability of scientists to explore the germplasm of plants and seem to weaken trade secrecy as a 
reliable method for maintaining property rights in plant materials. 
With advances in the biotechnical method of genetic fingerprinting, a new form of 
scientific evidence is now available for use in court cases dealing with infringement on 
property rights in plant materials. When high quality laboratory procedures are used, genetic 
fingerprinting provides a method of providing evidence with very low probability of being 
wrong about the origins of plant material (Roberts 1992). Thus, genetic fingerprinting can be 
expected to significantly reduce the transactions costs of enforcing property rights in plant 
materials (although they still may be large in some cases) and result in a general 
strengthening of intellectual property rights in plant materials. In the long term, this method 
seems likely to be an asset to high quality private plant research programs and to society. 
 
The U.S. Seed Industry 
The products for sale by the U.S. seed industry have historically been the results of 
both public and private varietal developments. The new and stronger intellectual property 
rights in plant materials and the relatively slow growth in public sector agricultural research 
funds mean that the private sector will become generally more dominant in the development 
and sale of commercial seed. 
A Few Characteristics of the Market 
A relatively large quantity of seed is used in the production of wheat and soybeans 
but the private sector seed companies find hybrid seed corn to be the most profitable. Table 2 
presents data on the total tonnage of seed used, and the quantity of wheat and soybeans used 
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as seed are several times larger than for corn. However, the marketing of seed corn has some 
major advantages over wheat and soybeans because seed corn is for a hybrid plant but most 
wheat and soybean seed is of a nonhybrid type. With hybrid seed, the grain from the hybrid 
is not acceptable seed, and the genetic makeup of the plant is not obvious. Thus, all seed corn 
is commercially purchased seed. Table 3 provides additional data on the national and state 
average seeding rates for hybrid corn. As everyone knows, the production of corn is centered 
very much in the Midwest. 
Although a large volume of seed is needed for seed wheat, only about 30 percent of 
the seed is purchased commercially each year. The use of purchased seed does differ across 
the wheat producing states, but Table 4 shows that in the major wheat producing states of 
Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and Colorado the rate of use of commercially purchased seed is 
less than 40 percent. In particular, Kansas accounts for about one-third of U.S. wheat acreage 
but only 27 percent of the wheat area was planted to commercially purchased seed in 1991. 
The extensive use of bin-run seed has resulted in a number of private seed companies pulling 
out of the wheat variety development business. Public sector developed varieties have been 
and will continue to be the primary source of new wheat varieties (Huffman and Evenson 
1993, Ch. 6). 
A relatively large quantity of soybean seed is needed each year to plant the crop. 
Table 5 shows that in1991 about 73 percent of the soybean acreage was planted to 
commercially purchased seed. This rate is an increase by 5 percentage points since 1989. 
Table 5 also provides information on the seeding rate for soybeans by major soybean 
producing states in 1991 and on the percentage of the acreage planted to purchased seed. In 
Illinois and Iowa, the two largest soybean producing states, the rate of use of purchased seed 
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in 1991 was 73 and 81 percent, respectively. Although 30 years ago a large share of the 
soybean varieties was publicly developed (see Huffman and Evenson 1993, Ch. 6), private 
varieties have made major inroads during the 1980s. Table 6 shows the share of total soybean 
seed from purchased private seed in 1991. For Illinois and Iowa, the commercially purchased 
private varieties accounted for 63 and 78 percent respectively. In the south, commercially 
purchased private varieties, however, accounted for generally less than 50 percent of the total 
soybean seed in 1991. Soybean variety development is an area where private seed companies 
seem to have a good future. 
The Economics of Pricing Varietal Innovations 
When a company has property rights in new plant material due to traditional plant 
breeding or to biotech methods (Moffat 1992a,b; Kalton, Richardson, and Frey 1989), say a 
new variety, it must decide how to price the new material so as to increase company net 
income. We can consider a simple example of an innovation (x), say a new hybrid corn 
variety that is used to produce a final product (Q), say corn for grain. Furthermore, let's make 
a not unreasonable assumption that the use of the new innovation is proportional (1-to-1) to 
the output of Q produced. Also, we assume that the market demand curve for Q is QQDD ′ in 
the upper panel of Figure 1 and the initial supply curve for Q (without the new innovation) is 
So. The innovation or new variety results in the reduction in the cost of production of Q to S1 
if it were totally free. 
We can obtain the derived demand for the use of the innovation (x) or the corn 
variety, and it is represented in the lower panel of Figure 1. The derived demand for x 
is .  This is a kinked demand curve for the services of x, and it has a marginal 
revenue curve of d
xx ddd ′
xdfMRx, which is discontinuous. Furthermore, we assume that the 
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marginal cost of providing x (say the seed of the new variety) is represented by constant 
marginal cost of MCx in Figure 1. 
Now we can ask what is the optimal price for the services of the new innovation? 
By optimal, I mean the price that maximizes the profits of the owner of the rights to the 
innovation or variety. It is at a rate of use where the marginal revenue equals the marginal 
cost. This is at the rate of use x*, and the profit maximizing price for the services of the 
innovation is R*. 
When the cost of the innovation is added to the marginal production cost or the 
supply price of Q excluding the cost of x, the new supply curve for Q (after the innovation 
and with a charge for x) is S1+R*.  Thus, when the innovation is priced optimally for 
maximum profit, the market price of Q is reduced from P0 to P2 and the quantity consumed is 
increased slightly from Q0* to Q2*.  Furthermore, the profit maximizing price for the new 
variety is not one that captures all of the cost reduction associated with its use. Some of the 
benefits go to consumers, and this is the source of what Evenson and I (Huffman and 
Evenson 1993, Ch. 7 and 9) have discovered to be a positive social rate of return on private 
sector R&D. Even when private firm optimally price their innovation, there are frequently 
additional benefits to society. 
In a more complete analysis, one would need to take account of the rate of adoption 
of the innovation (Griliches 1960) and the development of substitutes for x by the owner of 
the rights to x and by others and use of bin-run seed for nonhybrid seed. Also, pathogens 
could develop that attack x and make it generally useless. Some innovations change the 
quality of the final product (Q) so it is worth more as a result of the innovation and shifts the 
demand curve. These are all issues in a more thorough analysis of the economics of plant 
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innovations. 
The Size of Public and Private Crop Research Activities 
The public and private sectors are engaged in crop research activities. Table 7 
presents information USDA, SAES, and of total public (USDA and SAES) research 
expenditures in 1980 (in 1990 dollars) and in 1990 for field crops and forages; fruits, 
vegetables, nursery, and greenhouse plants; and other crops or plants. These expenditures 
include both those oriented to plant improvement and to other plant related research. In 1980, 
expenditures on cotton, soybean, and corn research were similar at slightly more than $60 
million. Soybean research accounted for slightly less, about $48 million. In 1990, corn and 
soybean research exceeded $70 million and wheat and cotton research remained at the $60+ 
million expenditure level. Perhaps surprising to some are the relatively large public sector 
expenditures on forage research (alfalfa, other forage legumes, and forage grasses). In 1980, 
the total expenditures were $81 million, but the decreased to $72 million in 1990. Taken as a 
group, total public expenditures on field crop and forage research were only 6.7 percent 
larger in real terms in 1990 than in 1980. This is a small overall increase, but increases for 
corn, wheat, and other oil seed research were much larger. 
A surprisingly large amount of public agricultural research expenditures go to fruits 
and vegetables, more than $120 million each for 1980 and 1990. The major growth between 
1980 and 1990 was in research expenditures on vegetables (20 percent). 
The private sector is investing heavily in corn research. This is seen by examining the 
information in Table 8 on the number of full-time equivalent scientific personnel doing some 
time of plant breeding research for 1989. This information shows that about one-half of all 
the private sector plant breeders and about 40 percent of the plant-related biotechnology 
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research is focused on corn. In field crops, soybean breeding research is second in 
importance. For both of these crops, the number of Ph.D. level private sector plant breeders 
is much larger than for the public sector. However, in wheat and forages plant breeding 
research, there are a larger number of public sector scientists than private sector scientists. 
These differences are due to differences in expected profitability of the different types of 
varietal research, especially the extent of use of bin-run seed. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
The developed countries of the world have had well defined intellectual property 
rights in plant materials for more than two decades. Furthermore, most of these countries 
have been strengthening these rights. They have been a key factor behind the development 
and growth of a private seed industry and a general reduction in the relative importance of 
the public sector in commercial variety development. The developing countries are lagging 
three to five decades behind the developed countries in their intellectual property 
institutions. If these countries are going to make a transition to higher sustained real 
economic growth, they seem likely to need larger human capital investments and stronger 
intellectual property rights. Their attempts to continue to borrow plant technology from the 
developed countries seem likely to run into difficulties. First, the biology of plants are such 
that the locality of adaptation is relatively small, so plant materials from developed countries 
have the greatest potential for use directly as parent material rather than for commercial 
varieties. Second, the developed countries are applying greater economic incentives for the 
developing countries to participate positively in a common intellectual property system. 
Thus, the developing countries must face up to developing their own scientific expertise and 
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capacity for applied crop research. Modern biotechnology seems to have increased the value 
of germplasm of unusual plant materials. This raises new issues about ownership and 
transfer of landraces, wild plants, and indigenous materials. 
In the United States, the private sector will in general become an increasingly 
important source of improved plant varieties for agriculture. The public sector will undertake 
varietal developments only when it is unprofitable for the private sector, e.g., in wheat, 
forages, and other small grains. The public sector will shift its emphasis more heavily into 
pretechnology science which is needed for long term productivity of private sector improved 
plant material development and which is generally unprofitable work for private firms to 
undertake. The public sector should not establish a common practice of selling property 
rights to new plant materials (or other intellectual materials) to the private sector for 
commercial development.  Public sector profiting directly from sale of intellectual property 
most likely reduces the profitability of private sector R&D activities and distorts the 
incentives for using public research resources away from advancing knowledge in the 
pretechnology sciences to applied science and technology development. It, also, has the 
potential for eventually undermining the "public goodwill" for public financial support of 
university research.
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Table 1. Plant Variety Protection Certificate Issued in the U.S. by Crop, 1971-1991 
  
1971-74
 
1975-78
 
1979-82
 
1983-86
 
1987-91
Total
 Issues
 
% Public
 
FIELD CROPS AND FORAGES 
Corn (field) 
Sorghum 
Wheat 
Barley 
Oats 
Soybeans 
Alfalfa 
Cotton 
 
VEGETABLES 
Lettuce 
Garden Beans 
Peas 
0
13
0
0
34
0
22
14
32
20
1
42
12
11
69
3
31
17
39
48
6
60
2
5
135
21
38
14
21
46
40
30
23
1
155
16
31
15
29
61
115
97
5
8
106
31
53
33
162
3
242
42
25
499
71
175
93
121
175
 
 
0.6
0
30.2
7.1
56.0
15.8
18.3
13.1
0
0
0
 
Source: USDA, Plant Variety Protection Official Journal. 
 
Table 2. Seed Use for Major U.S. Field Cropsa
  
 
Crops  1988/89 1989/90
 
1990/91b
 
1991/92c
  
        -----------------------------1,000 tons----------------------------- 
Corn 
Sorghum 
Soybeans 
Barley 
Oats 
Wheat 
Rice 
Cottond 
 
Total 
515
42
1,751
360
433
3,090
150
112
6,453
529
31
1,664
320
361
3,000
160
94
6,159
540 
36 
1,722 
350 
306 
2,670 
168 
108 
 
5,892 
556
37
1,670
357
275
2,804
174
102
5,975
 
aCrop marketing year. 
bPreliminary. 
cProjected. 
dUpland cotton. 
 
Source: USDA, Agricultural Resources: Inputs, AR-25, Feb. 1992. 
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Table 3.  Corn for Grain Seeding Rates, Plant Population, and Seed Cost per Acre, 19911
 
 
 
 
 
U.S./States 
 
Acres 
Planted2
 
Rate per 
Acre 
Plant 
Population 
per Acre 
 
Cost per 
Acre 
 
U.S. 
 
Thousand Kernels Number Dollars 
1991 average 60,350 24,906 22,080 20.79
1990 average 58,800 24,700 21,040 20.50
1989 average 57,900 24,100 20,760 20.40
States – 1991 
 
Illinois 11,300 25,511 23,700 21.09
Indiana 5,800 25,027 22,400 20.26
Iowa 12,200 25,285 22,800 20.49
Michigan 2,600 24,279 21,800 20.49
Minnesota 6,600 26,602 23,900 22.98
Missouri 2,200 22,575 19,900 19.87
Nebraska 8,300 24,501 22,200 20.21
Non-irrigated 2,747 18,648 nr 15.64
Irrigated 5,553 27,397 nr 22.47
Ohio 3,800 26,442 23,200 22.51
South Dakota 3,750 19,111 17,500 16.03
Wisconsin 3,800 25,611 23,400 19.16
 
nr – Not reported 
 
1States planted 80 percent of U.S. corn acres in 1991. 
2Preliminary for 1991. 
 
Source:  USDA, Agricultural Resources: Inputs, AR-24 and AR-25, 1991 and 1992. 
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 Table 4. Winter Wheat Seeding Rates, Seed Cost per Acre, and Percent of Seed Purchased, 19911
 
 
 
 
States 
 
 
 
Acres 
 
Rate 
per Acre 
 
 
Cost  
per Acre2
 
Acres with 
Purchased 
Seed 
 Thousands Pounds Dollars Percent 
 
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Kansas 
Missouri 
Michigan 
Nebraska 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
South Dakota 
Texas 
Washington 
 
1991 average 
930
2,300
700
1,400
750
10,800
1,550
1,900
2,100
1,100
5,000
800
1,300
2,800
750
34,180
137
45
86
110
118
60
115
58
62
137
73
72
64
74
71
74
 
13.13 
3.52 
10.16 
14.22 
18.10 
7.49 
16.25 
4.69 
5.20 
16.59 
6.42 
7.66 
4.22 
7.34 
9.46 
 
8.65 
58
36
70
59
79
27
64
30
25
52
21
65
31
40
70
36
 
1Preliminary. States listed harvested 86 percent of U.S. winter wheat acres in 1991. 
2Based on data from those farmers who used purchased seed. 
 
Source: USDA, Agricultural Resources: Inputs, AR-24-AR-25, 1991 and 1992. 
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 Table 5. Soybean Seeding Rates, Seed Cost per Acre, and Percent Seed Purchased, 19911
 
 
U.S./States 
 
Acres 
Planted 
 
Rate 
per Acre 
 
Cost 
per Acre1
 
Acres with 
Purchased Seed 
 Thousand Pounds Dollars Percent 
U.S.     
   1991 average2 
   1990 average 
   1989 average 
 
49,650 
48,250 
51,130 
64 
62 
60 
 
15.07 
14.20 
15.50 
73 
71 
68 
States - 1991     
   Northern: 
      Illinois 
      Indiana 
      Iowa 
      Minnesota 
      Missouri 
      Nebraska 
      Ohio 
 
   Southern: 
      Arkansas 
      Georgia 
      Kentucky 
      Louisiana 
      Mississippi 
      North Carolina 
      Tennessee 
 
9,200 
4,450 
8,800 
5,500 
4,500 
2,500 
3,900 
 
 
3,200 
  650 
1,150 
1,450 
1,900 
1,350 
1,100 
 
66 
67 
61 
68 
65 
61 
77 
 
 
58 
49 
61 
52 
53 
65 
53 
 
16.44 
15.85 
16.35 
14.65 
15.20 
15.80 
16.26 
 
 
11.74 
10.24 
13.54 
12.12 
10.38 
14.09 
10.07 
 
73 
82 
81 
74 
61 
78 
69 
 
 
55 
81 
64 
95 
78 
73 
55 
 
1States planted 83 percent of U.S. soybean acres in 1991. 
2Preliminary. 
3Based on data from farmers. 
 
Source:  USDA, Agricultural Resources: Inputs, AR-24 and AR-25, 1991 and 1992. 
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Table 6. Soybeans: Commercially Purchased versus Bin-Run Seed, 1991 
 
 
Purchased Seed 
 
 
REGION/STATE Private Variety 
% 
Public Variety 
 % 
 
Bin-Run 
Variety 
% 
 
MIDWEST 
 
   Illinois 
   Indiana 
   Iowa 
   Minnesota 
   Missouri 
   Nebraska 
   Ohio 
 
 
SOUTH 
 
   Arkansas 
   Mississippi 
   Tennessee 
   Georgia 
   North Carolina 
63
65
78
45
42
72
41
54
47
52
41
54
8
15
4
15
18
5
27
9
16
9
14
19
29
20
18
39
40
24
33
37
37
39
45
27
U.S.              70 30
 
Source:  Private Industry Estimates 
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 Table 7.  Public Agricultural Research Expenditures by Crop, 1980 and 1990 
 
Expenditures 1980 ($ mil)a
  
    Expenditures 1990 ($ mil) 
  
 
 
 
 
PLANT RESEARCH 
 
 
 
SAES 
 
 
 
USDA 
 
 
Total 
Public 
 
 
 
 
SAES 
 
 
 
USDA 
 
 
Total 
Public 
 
% Change 
of Total 
1980-90 
 
FIELD CROPS AND FORAGES 
 
Corn 
Sorghum 
Wheat 
Other small grains/cereals 
Soybeans 
Other oil crops 
Alfalfa 
Other forage legumes 
Forage grasses 
Cotton 
 
         Subtotal 
 
 
 
 
42.5 
11.7 
30.2 
23.6 
45.4 
14.0 
 
58.3 
 
26.4 
 
(252.1) 
 
 
 
 
19.5 
 4.1 
17.6 
10.4 
20.9 
 9.5 
 
22.4 
 
 41.9 
 
(146.3) 
 
 
 
 
62.0 
15.8 
47.8 
34.0 
66.3 
23.5 
 
80.7 
 
68.3 
 
(398.4) 
 
  
 
 
47.2 
13.0 
42.1 
21.5 
45.0 
18.0 
 
48.5 
 
22.8 
 
(258.1) 
 
 
 
 
29.3 
2.9 
24.1 
11.4 
27.4 
10.2 
 
23.2 
 
39.2 
 
(167.7) 
 
 
 
 
76.5 
15.9 
66.2 
32.9 
72.4 
28.2 
 
71.7 
 
62.0 
 
(425.8) 
 
 
 
 
21.0 
0.6 
32.6 
-3.3 
8.8 
18.2 
 
-11.8 
  
- 9.7 
 
(6.7) 
 
FRUITS, VEGETABLES, NURSERY,     GREENHOUSE 
 
Fruits and nuts 
Vegetables 
Ornamentals and turf 
 
                Subtotal 
 
OTHER CROPS 
 
TOTAL 
90.1 
92.9 
37.5 
 
(220.5) 
 
28.1 
 
500.7 
38.3 
 30.2 
5 8.5 
 
(77.0) 
 
25.9 
 
249.2 
128.4 
123.1 
46.0 
 
(297.5) 
 
54.0 
 
749.9 
 93.4 
114.1 
41.7 
 
(249.2) 
 
33.7 
 
541.0 
45.2 
36.9 
6.1 
 
(88.2) 
 
19.9 
 
275.8 
138.6 
151.0 
47.8 
 
(337.4) 
 
53.6 
 
816.8 
7.6 
20.4 
3.8 
 
(12.6) 
 
-0.7 
 
8.5 
 
aExpressed in 1990 research dollars (by inflating current 1980 dollars by 1.726 (Huffman and Evenson 1992)). 
 
Source:  U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Inventory of Agricultural Research, 1980 (1990). 
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Table 8.  Ph.D. Level Scientific Personnel Involved in Plant Breeding, 1989 (Full Time Equivalent) 
 
     No. Plant Breeding Research 
 
   Breeders/Geneticists 
 
CROPS 
 
Publica
 
Private 
 
 
Private 
Biotech 
 
FIELD CROPS 
   
 
Corn 36.6 256.9 90.1
Sorghum 12.2 22.8 -
Wheat 38.4 25.2 1.1
Other small grains/cereals 39.4 14.8 0.7
Soybeans 32.7 59.7 17.3
Other oil crops 14.9 13.0 10.5
Alfalfa 27.1 2.1
Other forage legumes  9.3 28.3 -
Forage grasses 27.1 1.6 -
Cotton 15.2 11.1 7.2
 
Subtotal (252.9) (433.4) (129.0)
 
FRUITS, VEGETABLES, NURSERY, GREENHOUSE 
 
Fruits and nuts 47.4 0.3
-
Vegetables 81.1 108.3  31.4
Flowers and nursery 13.2 16.4 -
 
Subtotal (141.7) (125.0)  (31.4)
OTHER CROPS 22.2 22.0   91.5
 
TOTAL 
 
416.8 580.4 251.9
 
aCombined scientists in USDA-ARS and SAES. 
 
Sources: Column (1) is from James (1990) and columns (2) and (3) are from Kalton, Richardson, and 
Frey (1989). 
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Table 9.  Change in U.S. Patenting Activity 1985 to 1990 in Selected Fields of Science and Ties of New Patents to Intellectual 
Materials 
 
Average No. Citations by New U.S. Patents to: 
 
U.S. Patents  
 
  Foreign Patents
 
Science Publications
 
 
 
 
FIELD OF SCIENCE/ 
INSTITUTION 
  
 
 
 
1985 
(%) 
  
 
 
 
1990 
(%) 
 
 
 
Change 
1988-90 
(%) 
   1985    1990   1985    1990 1985 1990 
 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
     Corporate 
     Academic 
     Other 
     Total 
 
BOTANY AND 
GENETICS 
 
     Corporate 
     Academic 
     Other 
     Total 
 
42.5
10.8
46.7
100.0
34.5
17.2
48.3
100.0
44.5
11.0
44.5
100.0
58.4
4.4
37.2
100.0
 
 
 
40
 
 
35
 
 
 
 
119
 
 
67
 
 
 
5.3 
3.6 
- 
4.6 
 
 
 
 
3.3 
1.7 
- 
2.0 
 
 
 
 
4.3 
3.2 
- 
4.6 
 
 
 
 
2.1 
1.4 
- 
2.7 
 
 
 
 
0.8 
.3 
- 
.7 
 
 
 
 
1.4 
.7 
- 
1.2 
 
 
 
 
1.5 
1.0 
- 
1.6 
 
 
 
 
1.0 
0 
- 
1.6 
 
 
 
 
4.8 
5.7 
- 
3.4 
 
 
 
 
4.5 
5.0 
- 
2.9 
 
 
 
 
4.3 
6.7 
- 
4.4 
 
 
 
 
4.1 
4.0 
- 
3.6 
 
AGRICULTURE 
  (farm machinery, ag. chemical, ag. pharmaceutical) 
     Corporate 
     Academic 
     Other 
     Total 
48.3
1.7
50.0
100.0
42.4
5.1
47.5
100.0
-11
 
 
2
8.3 
7.0 
- 
5.7 
4.4 
6.3 
- 
4.2 
1.7 
7.0 
- 
5.7 
1.8 
0 
- 
1.5 
.3 
0 
- 
0.1 
.3 
3.7 
- 
0.4 
 
Source:  Random sample of patents at U.S. Patent Office.  Bob Evenson, Yale University, grouped patent classes into fields of   
science. 
 
Figure 1.  The derived demand and optimal pricing of an innovation (x) that is closely linked to a final  
                product (Q) 
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